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L\ THE SUl'HE:\lE COLHT OF THE STATE OF UT,\H
------------oooOooo-----------AETC\_\ LIFE ~\i\D CASU_.\LTY,
Plaintiff and
Hespondent,
vs.

Case No. 15306

ll:\ITED P_A.CIFIC /RELIANCE
Ii'\STJRX::\CE COMPANIES,
Defendant and
Appellant.
------------oooOooo-----------BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Honorable Dean E. Conder,
Judge

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER

COURT

The Lower Court granted respondent's l\Iotion for Summary Judgment and denied appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEi\L
Respondent requests that the .Judgment of the District
Court be affirmed.

-1Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STYIE\11·::\T OF 1· .\CT::i
On July 1, 1~)/0, Lr•itcd PctClflc/Fk!JcuJce lnsur 1 f!Ce

Coll<[nni<':-; (hercin:tftcr "Lnit·.~d Petcific") i:-;'""-'d to Rcginct Grarje !':·>
ducts Compcll1y (hcrcin:,fter "Hcgina") its Comprehensive LiaLi!Jt;
Insurance Policy, l\o. CLP :32221 effecti\ e from .July 1, 1970 to Jul: _
1973, with a limit of $1,000,000 for personal inJuries arbing from c
"·

occurrence.

At all times material herein, :\etna Life and Casualty

(hereinafter "Aetna") was the liability insurance carrier of Heublein,
Incorporated (hereinafter "Heublein").
On December 31, l!.l70, one George Shuput, while open-

ing a bottle of Wedding Party Pink Champagne was struck in the eye b,
the champagne cork and severely injured.
Effective February 1, 1971, having been accomplished
on January 28, 1971, Regina, a California corporGtion, merged with
Heublein, Incorporated, a Connecticut corporGtion.
Plan

Article II of the

and Agreement of ;\!erger between Heublein Gnd Regina sbted:
The laws which shall govern the
Surviving Corpor:1tion are the laws
of the State of Connecticut. The
CertificGte of Incorporation of
Heublein as in effect on the Effective Date sh:1ll be the Certificate
of lf'corporation of the s~Jrdving
Corporation. The name of the
Survivinc; Corpo1·aLion shall be
'II,_:uhlein, Inc .. 1 •
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On Jum· 7, 1 ~~~. suit \·:2s fil~d in United States District
Coctct fot' the District of Utah, Central Di'.'ision, Ci\-ili\o.
by Gccorg~ Shuput etg::~inst Heublein.

c

195-73,

il trial was held, followed by an

aprkal to the Tenth Circuit Court which resulted in the case being remanded for a new trial.

The case was subsequently settled for the sum

of Sl8, 750.00 in September of 1975, and plaintiff incurred expenses in
connection with its defense and handling in the form of attorney's fees
and costs in the sum of $9,637. 39.

Defendant, although aware of all

the facts before this Court, refused the tender and did not participate
in the defense of the suit or its settlement.
Concededly, the defendant United Pacific never did issue
a policy of insurance to Heublein prior to January 17, 1971.

On the

other hand, United Pacific, admittedly, insured Regina at the time of
George Shuput's accident, which took place before the~ rger between
Regin3. and Heublein.

In the Shuput vs. Heublein lawsuit, Regina was

not named as a party to the action.
In the lower court, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment -_..-as granted and defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was
denied for the reason that on the date of the accident, United Pacific
was the only insurance carrier for Regina; that the Shuput claim was
covered by the United Pacific policy; that Heublein succeeded to the
rights of Regina by effect of the merger which took place after the
Shuput accident; and that the liability for the injury was fixed at the time
of ;he Clccident.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library purposes
Services and Technology
Act, Brief
administered
by the
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For
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-3-

Aetna's insurance policy al'L' listed hdow:
6. Other Insurdtlce. The insurance
afforded by this policy is pril!l:try insurance, except when slated to apply
in excess of or ccmtingcnt upon the
absence of other insurccnce. \Vb.en
this insurance is primary and the
insured has other insurance which is
stated to be applicable to the loss on
an excess or contingent basis, the
amount of the company's liability under this policy shall not be reduced
by the existence of such other insurance.
When both this insurance and other
insurance apply to the loss on the same
basis, whether primary, excess or contingent, the company shall not be liable
under this policy for a greater proportion of the loss than that stated in the
applicable contribution provision below:
(a)

-,- -.

, -.-

(b)

Contribution by Limits. If any of
other insurance does not provide
for contribution by equal shares,
the company shall not be liable
for a greater prorortion of such
loss than the applicable limit of
liability under this policy for such
loss bears to the total applicable
limit of liability of all valid and
collectible insurance against such
loss.

For purposes of this Drief, the applicable provisions.c.;
United P<J.cific' s insurance policy are listed below:
UNITED PACIFIC TNSTJHANCE COiVIP:O.:\Y
(_'\ Stock Insurance Com p:my, herein co.llcd
the company), in consideration of the po.ySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by
the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-4Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment of the premium and subJ~Ct
to all the teems of this policy, agrees
with the insured named in the declarations, hereinafter called "named
insured," as follows:
!::\SURING AGREEi\IENTS
Liability. To pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay
by reason of the liability for damages
(a) imposed upon him by law or (b)
assumed by him under any contract or
agreement wholly in writing, because
of: Bodily Injury,

I.

Property Damage;
further, to defend any suit against the
insured in which such damages are
sought, reserving to the company the
right to investigate, negotiate and
settle any claims or suit.
Definitions of interest are as follows:
DEFINITIONS
As Used in This Policy:
(a) "bodily injury" means bodily injury
sickness or disease sustained by a person, including (1) death resulting therefrom and (2) damages for care and loss
of services because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease.

(c) "occurrence" means an accident,
an event or a continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions causing, during
the policy period, bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended by the insured. All injury or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
-5- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dan1:.1ge arising out of cxpo.oun:
due to substantially the same
general condition sh~.dl be considered as arising out of one
occurrence.
(d) "insured" means the named insured, his spouse, if a resident
in the same household, and: . . "
Named insured in this case would be:

1.

Regina Grape Products Company, a California Cor. ;

2.

Regina Grape Products Company, a California Cor.

poration;

poration, doing business as:
(a) Ellena Brothers
(b) Poca Mas Wine Company
(c) Garrett Bottling Company
(d) San Sevine Vineyard Company
(e) Sycamore Valley Vineyards
(f) Verdemont Vineyard Company
3.

John B. Ellena and Arliss T. Ellena.

For purposes of this Brief the following are the applicable statutory provisions:

1.

General Statues of Connecticut § 33-37l(c) (1958 as

amended):
Upon the effectiveness of :1 merger or consolidation:
(a) The merging corporations or consolidating
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
digitization provided byp:1rty
the Institute
Museum
and Library
Services
corporations
toofthe
pl:1n
of merger
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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or consolidation shall be a
sil';:;le corporo.tion which, in
thee case of a merger, shall
be that corporation designated
in the plan of merger as the
S'Jrviving corporation and, in
the case of a consolidation, shall
be the new corporation provided
for in the plan of consolidation;

2.

(b)

The separate existence of all corporation parties to the plan of
merger or consolidation, except
the surviving or new corporation,
shall cease;

(c)

The surviving or new corporation
shall thereupon and thereafter, to
the extent consistent with its Certificate of Incorporation as in effect
upon effecting the merger or consolidation, possess all the rights, privileges, immunities and franchises, as
well of a public as of a private nature,
of each of the merging or consolidating
corporations; and all property, real,
personal and mixed, and all debts
due on whatever account, and all other
choses in action, and all and every
other interest, of or belonging to or
due to each of the corporations so
merged or consolidated, shall be
taken and transferred to and vested
in such single corporation without
further act or deed; and the title to
any real estate, or any interest therein,
vested in any of such corporation shall
not revert or be in any way impaired by
reason or such merger or consolidation.
[Emphasis Added].

General Statutes of Connecticut § 33-369(e) (1953 as

amended):
-7-
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The Surviv1ng or i\cw corpor~tion shall
henceforth be responsible, and lid!Jlc for
all the liabilities, oblige1tions and penaltics, including liability to descending
shareholders, or each of the merging
or consolidating corporations; and any
claim existing or action or proceeding,
civil or criminal, pending by or against
any such corporation may be prosecuted
as if such merger of consolidation had not
taken place, or such surviving or new
corporation may be substituted in its
place; and any judgment rendered against
any of the merging or consolidating
corporations may be enforced against the
surviving or new corporation. . ..

3.

Utah Code Annotated § 6-10-72(b)(3) (1953 as

amended):
. . . The effect of such merger or consolidation shall be the same as in the case
of the rre rger or consolidation of domestic
corporations. If the suviving or new
corporation is to be governed by the laws
of this state. If the surviving or new
corporation is to be governed by the
laws of any state other than this state,
the effect of such merger or consolidation shall be the same as in the case of
the merger or consolidation of domestic
corporation [s] except insofar as the laws
of such other state provide otherwise.
4.

Utah Code Annotated§ 16-10-71(e) (1953 as amerc
Such surv·iving or new corporation shall
thence forth be responsible and liable for
all the liabilities and obligations of each
of the corporations so merged or consolidated; and any claim existing or action
or proceeding pending by or against any
of such corporation may be prosecuted
as if such merger or consolidation bad

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-8Library Services and Technology Act, administered by
the Utah State Library.
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not taken place, or such survivincr
or new corporation may be sub- "'
stituted in its place. . ..

This appeal arises out of a judgment adverse to
appellant in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
wherein the lower court held that United Pacific was obligated to
inde~c:1nily Aetna in the sum of $28,387.39,

for the reason that

United Pacific, at the time of the Shuput accident, was the only
insurer covering the same and that Heublein succeeded to the right
or Regina by effect of the merger.

POINT I.

THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS MEANING OF UNITED PACIFIC'S INSURANCE
POLICY IS THAT REGIT\IA GRAPE PRODUCTS COMPANY WAS AN INSURED
ON DECEMBER 31, 1970.

It is agreed by both parties that on July 1, 1970, United
Pacific issued to Regina its Policy No. CLP 322 21 effective from
July 1, 1970, to July 1, 1973, with a limit of $1,000,000, for

perw nal injuries arising from each occurrence.

It is further

agreed that on the date of the accident, December 31, 1970, the
Comprehensive Policy of Liability Insurance was in force covering
Regina.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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POll\:T

II.

UPON MERGER OH CONSOLIDAT!Ol\,
CAUSES OF ;\CTION AGPdNST THE
MERGED OR CONSTITUENT COI\IPAJ\Y ORDii'\"\RILY SHOULD BE
BROUGHT AGAINST THE NEW COi\1PANY INTO WHICH THE OTHER IS
MERGED.

George Shuput filed suit against Heublein on June 7,
1973.

Appellant contends that there is no liability on the part of

United Pacific bec:-tuse (1) no suit was ever instituted by Shuput
against Regina, and (2) there was never a final JUdgment by Shuput
against Regina.

The traditional rule that causes of action against
a merged company should be brought against the new company
is stated in Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation,

Vol. 15, § 7170

"Right of Creditors to Sue Constituent Corporation after Consolidation," p. 310 as follows:

Upon merger of consolid~ltion, causes of
action against the merged company or a
constituent comp::ltly ordinarily should
be brought against the new company or
the company into which the other is merged.
·where the constituent or absorbed companies cease to exist, no action can be
maintained against such companies after
the consolidation or merger, unless the
right to sue is reserved by the statute
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

authorizing the consolidation, ;:,s
by preserving their sepJ.ratc
existence for purpose of suits
or otherwise . . . . [Emphasis
Added].
The following cases are cited in support of that general
proposition:

Lam vs. White, 216 Ky. 134, 287 S. W. 530; Lee vs.

Stillwater and M. St.R. Co., 140 App. Div. 779, 125 N.Y. S. 840;
Dalmas vs. Phillipsburg and S. V. R. Company, 254 Pa. 9,

98

A. 796.

Connecticut by statute, permits a suit against a merged corporation to be directed against the new corporation, to wit:
General Statutes of Connecticut § 33-369{e) {1958 as amended),

The Surviving or New corporation shall henceforth be responsible and liable for all the
liabilities, obligations and penalties, including liability to
descending shareholders, or
each of the merging or consolid;:,ting corporations; and any
claim existing or action or
proceeding, civil or criminal,
pending by or against any such
merger of consolidation had
not taken place, or such surviving or new corporation may
be substituted in its place; and
any judgment rendered against
any of the merging or consolidating cor-

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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poL1tions rua.Y L>c enforced ag~1inst
the surviving ot· new corporzttion.
[Emphasis Added].
Utah has a similar statutP, U.C.A. § 16-10-71{e) (He
which reads:
Such surviving or new corporations
shall henceforth be responsible and
liable for all the liabilities and obligations of each of the corporations
so merged or consolidated; and any
claim existing or action or proceeding pending by or against any of such
corporations may be prosecuted as
if such merger or consolidation had
not taken place, or such surviving or
new corporation may be substituted in
its place . . . . [Emphasis Added].

In short, because the lawsuit by Shuput was initiated in
June 1973, approximately two years after the Regina-Heublein merger,
it was entirely proper for Shuput to direct his complaint against
Heublein, the surviving corporation.
in fact, suing Regina.

By suing Heublein, Shuput was,

Therefore, it is not accurate to state that no

suit was ever instituted by Shuput against Regina, nor that there had
never been a final judgment against Regina.
POINT III.
WHEN AN ACCIDENT COVERED BY A COl\1PRE-

HENSIVE LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY OCCURS,
THE COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY POLICY C/ISTS.
UPON THE INSURER CONTINGENT COL\T&'\.CTU,\L
OBLIG-\ TIONS TO THE INSUTIED.
Since Seider vs. Roth,

17 N. Y.2d 111,269 N. Y.S. 2a:'.

216 N.E.2d 312 (1066), courts have generally held that as soon as an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the -12Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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accir!c:~,t occurs there J.re imposed upon the insurer contractual obli-

gc.t iu:l.ci '.'.l:!ch

!Cl

u st be c onside reel "debts" owing to the insured.

A !though

the Seider vs. Roth, supra, position on the jurisdictional issue (i.e.
tr.a.t the contingent contractual obligation is a "debt" which may be
attached to pro\·ide quasi-in- rem jurisdiction) has been hotly debated
and generally rejected; nevertheless, the majority of courts recognize
that once an accident covered by insurance occurs there are imposed
upon the insurer contingent contractual obligations which must be considered "debts" owing to the insured.
The Utah Supreme Court in Housley vs. Anaconda, 19
Utah 2d 124, 429 P.2d 390 (1967) although primarily discussing whether
the garnishment of such a contingent debt was sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, recognized that after an accident covered by insurance and prior
to judgment, the insurer owes contingent contractual obligations to the
insured.

In that case defendant Cox, while driving a motor vehicle owned

by tl'e _-\naconda Company, drove into the rear of an automobile being

dri\·en by the plaintiff Shirlee H. Housley, and owned by the plaintiff
Reese C. Housley.
State of Ctah.

Shortly after the accident, Cox departed from the

The plaintiff caused a Writ of Garnishment to be served

:1pon. the Traveler's Insurance Company, the insurer of the vehicle in,~ 0 lnod in the collision.

The Utah Supreme Court recognized the insurer's

contingent obligation as follov:s:
We are of opinion that prior to the
plaintiff
obtaining
a provided
judgment
against
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law
Library. Funding
for digitization
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
-13-

defendant Cox in the main ~1ction,
the obligation of the Insurance
Company is contingent and not
subject to garnishment. [Emphasis Added).
For other cases throughout the country recognizing contingent sirnihr
contractual obligations see:

Javorek vs. Superior Court of Monterey

County, 131 Cal. Reptr. 768, 552 P. 2d 728 (1976); Robinson vs. Shear:
& Sons, Inc.,

429 F. 2d 83 (3rd Cir. 1970); Ricker vs. LaJoie, 31 4

F. Supp. 201(d) (Vt. 1970); Werner vs. Werner, 84 Wash. 2d 360, 52S
P.2d 370 (dicta) (1974); Johnson vs. Farmers Alliance MutualAssura~,·
Co., 499 P. 2d 1387 (Okla. 1972); Kirchman vs. iVlikula, 258 S. 2d 70!
(La.App. 1972); Howard vs. Allen, 254 S.C. 255, 176 S.E. 2d 127
(1970); DeRentiis vs. Lewis, 258
Donnelley, 413 Pa. 474 198 A.

A. 2d 464 (R.I. 1969);

'

and~~

2d 513 (1964).

In short, it is respondent's position that the contingent
contractual obligations owed by United Pacific to Regina passed, by
virtue of the Merger Agreement and applicable Connecticut law, to
Heublein.

Moreover, it asserts that such a transfer is consistent wii.

Utah law and public policy.
POINT IV.
UNDER APPLIC\BLE CONNECTICUT LAW
G. S.C. § 33-369(c) (1958 as amended), NOTHING IS LOST BY THE JVIERGEH OF CORPOHl\TlO;'\;S AND ANY RIGHT LAWFULLY BELONGING TO AJ\Y OF COH.POHATIONS fdERGED
TOGET!!Efl Cc\ :\'BE L'\SSERTE)) BY TilE SGHVlVINC CORPORATION.
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The merger bet\\een Regina, a California corporation,
a Connecticut corporation, took place on February 1, 1971.
The Sun iving Corporation was "Heublein, Inc." The laws which
go,-erneJ the Surviving Corporation were the laws of the State of Connecticut, ·:.-hich provide in pertinent part:
§ 33-369(c) . . . The surviving or
new corporation sh::lll thereupon and
thereafter, to the extent consistent
with its Certificate of Incorporation
as in effect upon effecting the merger
or consolidation, possess all the right,
privilege, immunities and franchises,
as well of a public as of a private nature,
of each of the merging or consolidating
corporation; and all property, real,
personal, and mixed, and all debts due
to each of the corporations so merged
or consolidated, shall be taken and
transferred to and vested in such single
corporation without further act or deed;
and the title to any real estate, or interest
therein, v-ested in any of such corporation
shall not re\•ert or be in any way impaired
by reason of such merger or consolidation. [Emphasis Added].

In this case, Heublein, the surviving corporation possessed
:cdl the rights, privileges, immunities and franchises and all other choses
in action, and all and every other interest belonging to or due Regina, the
merged corporation, including the contingent contractual obligations
which a.rose at the time of the loss covered by the United Pacific policy.
POINT V.
ACCILJENT COVERED BYCOMPREHENSI\'E
LL'l.BILITY POLICY CASTS UPON INSURER
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CO'\TI'\GE'd CO:\T IU CT U_ \ L Oil ur_; \T!Oi\S
\\'HICif CU:\S I'lTl TL ,\\ li\DI;Tn J:.:D\LSS 0\Vli\G TO THE COHPOI'v\TE E\SUHLD A:\D TIIAT
ASSJ:::T OF I:\SCRED, LP0:'-1 ITS :\IEHGEH \VITI!
A:'-JOTl!ER CORPOH_-\TI00!, L\UTO:\IATIC\LLY
\ l~STS I:\ TilE SLH\'1\T\G COHPOHATIO:'\i BY
VIHTCE OF THE GE:\EHAL STATUTES OF
COl\:\EC:TICCT, ~ 33-3GD(c) (1968 as amended).

_,

Herein lies the heart of respondent's argument.

The

::'\ew York Supreme Court, Special Term, decision entitled Chathan

Corporation vs. Argonaut Insurance Company, 70 Misc. 2d 1028, 334
N. Y.S.2d 959 (1972) is on all fours with this case and for that reason,
extensive discussion of the case is warranted.

In that case, plaintiff

Helen Gerdes, allegedly sustained injury as a result of the collapse
of a ladder manufactured by Baldwin Brush & Tools, Inc. (hereinafter
"Baldwin").

The component parts of that ladder had been supplied by

Duraluminum Ladder, :\Ifg. Co., Inc. (hereinafter "Duraluminum")
which was a named insured under e; Products Liability Policy issuedb
defendant, Argonaut Insurance Company, (hereinafter "Argonaut'').

I
Subsequent to the accident but prior to the lawsuit, Dure;luminum mer;'
with Chatham Corporation (hereinafter "Chatham"), the successor
corporation being Chatham.
The plaintiff brought an action against Baldwin.
B<'ddwin lev-eled a Third- Pc,rty Complaint against Chatham.

In tw·t'.

Ch~thcm

brought a Decbratory .Tud~ment action ag<Jinsl Argon:J.ut to ddcrminc
· ht s o f ,.c~.e par·tic~
the respective rrg
- ~ unrher a Products Liability Im;urat
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by- the
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Polley, .-\rgollaul had i:;suecl to Duraluminum. Concededly, the defend.ttll _\) ;.un:.!Ut never did issue a policy of insurance to Chatham.

On

till' other hand, Argonaut admittedly insured Duraluminum at the time

of :\Irs. Gerdes' accident, which took place before the merger between
Ch:Jtham and Duraluminum.

In the principal lawsuit, Duraluminwn was

not named as a party to the action,
The Court held that Argonaut was obligated to defend
Chatham.

Directing itself to the identical issue before this court;

namely, the identity of the insured, the Supreme Court, Special Term,
of Ncwo York stated:
A question presented is one of identity of
the insured rather than the usual issue
of whether coverage is afforded under
the policy. Argonaut's issuance to
Duraluminum of the liability policy
cast upon the insurer contingent
contractual obligation which constitutes
an indebtedness owing to the insured
(Seider vs. Roth, 17 N.Y. 2d 111.269
N.Y. S. 2d 99,216 N. E. 2d 312) This
asset of Duraluminum, upon itsmerger with plaintiff, automatically
vested in plaintiff as the surviving
corporation by virtue of the provision of
subd. (b), paragraph 2, No. 2 of Section
906 of the Business Corporation Law.
It may be said, under the construction
given this statute, that nothing is lost
by a merger of corporation and that
any right lawfully belonging to any of
the constituent corporations merged
together cc1n be asserted by the surviving corporation (Platt Corporatwn
vs. Platt, 21 lL D. 2d 116, 120, 249
N.Y.S.2d
7o,
79, provided
affirmecl15
N.of Y.2cl
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70:>,

2~li

\. Y. S. 2cl 7:1,

/"~J,

aff> r·nwrl

15 ~ . Y . 2 d 7 0 5, 2 'J G i\ . Y . S. ~ d :l3 :J,
204 :\.E.2d 4:J:,). Yic\\<'cl in tl>is
light, tlw hilut·c tu indttdc· !Jur;duminum zts a d<cfcndant in tiJC third partv
action or to name it in the pleading;
lS not bl::>l, provided il can be ascETtained that Duraluminum, r2.lhcr
than some other party, is the subject
of the compbint brought by the third
party plaintiff. [Emphasis Added).

The applicable New York statutes referred to above arc
si.Inilar in all material in regards to the applicable Connecticut and L
I

Statutes.
Applying the Chatham Corp. vs. r'\rgonaut Insurance Cc
rule to the facts of this case, l.Tnited Pacific's issuance to Regina oftr,
Comprehensive Liability Policy cast upon United Pacific contingent
contractual obligations which constituted an indebtedness owing to Rei.
This asset of Regina, upon its merger with Heublein, automatically
\·ested in Heublein as the surviving corporation by virtue of the gener:.
statutes of Connecticut, § ::l3-3G!:J(c) (1958 as amended).

It may b,

under the construction given this sLJtute, that nothing was lost by the
merger of Hegina and Heublein and that any right lawfully belonging:c
Regina could be asserted by

liculJlein,

the surviving corpontion.

\'ic\,'Cd in this light, the f<.1illu·c of Shuput to include Regina as a defc
in tl!e ;1ction or to name Regina in the pleading was not fatal, prD\'id':
it ca.n be ascertained that H.cginc., rather lhan somt: othel' p:trty,
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1\'Jo

s .. :)- '- l uf th._. L<llilpl::ur,t brou~J1t by the plaintlff.

c'-- _-]· ickr•lify Rcgiru.

Till' st 1pubted facts

l'nrtccl Pacific was tenered the defense but

In !Lutford Fire Insurance Company vs. Union Graded
Sc~·ool

District i\'o. 73 of

G~rvin

County249 P.345 (1962), an action

\vas commenced in the District of Garvin County by Union Graded
School District No. 73 against the Hartford Fire Insurance Company
to recover upon a fire insurance policy, alleged to have been issued
by said company to School District i\'o. 29, Garvin County, Oklahoma,
insuring a school building and contents which were destroyed by fire
on February 16, 1924.

Earlier, on June 18, 1923, School District i\'o.

29, together with School Districts No. 40 and No. 67, were merged into
lnion Graded District i\'o. 73, pursuant to law.

Although the case is

not directly on point, the accident having occurred after the merger,
~.e·,·edhele3s, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma did recognize that the

i~,s'~c·er of the merged or constituent district was obligated to indemnify

tile s'.lrdving district for damages covered by the insurance policy
pre·:iou3l]' issued to the merged or constituent corporation.

A fortiori

th2.; holding would apply where the accident covered by the policy occurreci prior to the merger.
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PCJii\ l'

\1.

Tl!f~ "'\ClT.\L 1-'.\CTS .\S l~:\0\\:\ TO

Till·: INSLHEH DETL!t:\IIC\E TilE 1:\Slil{Elt'S DCTY TO lJEFE0J]) \\1 lERE
THEY 1\HE IN CONFLICT \\'ITll THE
.t'\LLEC!\TIONS OF TilE CO'dPL\L\T.
The gcncrc;l rule to the effect that the determindio

n rJ:

whether or not a clai.J:n made against the insured is one which by lhe
terms of the contract the insurer is required to defend depends upon
the facts stated in the complaint is based upon the ordinary or typicol
situation in which there is no conflict between the fctcts as they are
known to or ascertainable by the insurer.

Stated differently, the ger.:

rule does not take into account the possibility that such a divergence,
exist; in fact, the rule may affirmatively presuppose the absence therAccordingly, the cases supporting the general rule, as cited by the

av

lant in its Brief, are of hardly any value as authority in a situation v.i '
such divergence docs exist.

In this regard, there are no Utah c"se;

directly on point and there is a split of authority among tho.3e jurisdictions who have considered the question.
The better rule and apparent trend is tlnt the acbil
facts as known to or ascertainable by the insurer determine ttw.

':i-

surer's duty to defend \'.here they arc in conflict with the allegc.tions
of the cornpi:.li11t for tl1e reason that under the modern rules of civil
pl·ol'edurc the con1p 1~unt scn•ec. a notice: function anc! i:.; fra n1 Ec·d
-20Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

j

tr' J, ln turn, focuses on t~'ll' L2ts a:o they cxi:.;t rather tlnn on facts

\•:hiL"i: might exist under the: theory of recovery in the complaint.
c\ccordingly, the duty to defend should focus upon the facts as they
c:<ist

r~:thcr

than upon the alleg0tions of the complaint which m:1y or

ma} not control the ultimate determination of liability.
In lV!iJ liken vs. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y.
::J38 F. 2d 35, 40-41 (Tenth Circuit 1964) the tenth circuit court of

appeals stated that:
Here there were facts extraneous to the allegations of the
pleading which could make out
a case against the insured that
would be covered by the policy.
These facts could have been discovered b,y appellee if it had
made a reasonable investigation.
Appellee's duty to defend must be
determined in light of those facts
and, when so considered we conclude that appellee had a duty to
defend its insured's against the
claims asserted in the pollution
cases. Ha·,ing failed to defend
its insured's, appellee is liable
for costs and expenses they
incurred . . .
In the case of Spruill Motors, Inc. vs. Universal
l ~rci:cn·.riters Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 681, 521 P. 2d 403, 407 (1973)

z,n :,c,_ion w2.s urought by Spruill :\lotors, Inc. to recover from its
lini\'ers:d Underwrikrs Ins. Co., the judgment entered and
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The dcfenclz,nt

insur~tllc-c contpan; rcfusL·J lo clefcncl plaintiff insurr·d

because tl1e complaint alleged acts outside coverage of plaintiff's lia.
bility insurance: policy by alleging personal inJuries and property
damage intentionally inflicted by Spruill's employees.

By way of

conclusion the Supreme Court of Kansas stated:
It is our judgment that case

law must give way to statutory declarations. We must
overrule Leonard and Brown,
and any like decisions holding
that an insurer may rely on
the plaintiff's petition alone
to determine whether there is
a duty to defend. We adopt the
rule in l\Iilliken [lVIilliken vs.
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of
New York, 338 F.2d 35 (Tenth
Circuit 1964)] that an insurer
must look beyond the effect of
the pleadings and must consider any facts brought to its
attention or any facts which it
could reasonably discover in
determining whdhcr it has a
dutv to defend. If those facts
giv~ rise to a 'potential of liability' under the policy, the
insurer bears a duty to defend.
g a
A!.) ply1·n-

Sl.lnl·l~r
0

rt1lc·

·
I ns. C.u.,
in Kepner vs. Western F1re

,

tho~ Supremco Court of Arizona
109 Ariz. 328,509 P:2d 222

(l0 7 3) held that although the facts alleged in the complaint ostensibly
.
brought the case within the po l 1cy
cuverag e , whcore other facts know"
cJ plainlv
·
to or :lsccrtainc:Jhl.-, Lly the 1nsurc
J
•rntt th'.' C'c"Se outside> the
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c.,·.

c\': :~·· th~•t tl1•·cc: v:.1s :10 absolute duty to ddcnd.

In C\larshall' s l :•it<!d StJ.tc:s Auto Supply, Inc. vs.
~::1

s·.:prcmc

(':,sualty Co.
Cour~

3.~4

:\[iss. 455,188 S. W. 2d 529 (194;j), the

of :\lissouri ruled that an insurance company cannot

iz:wr·c the actual facts of \'.·hich it has knowledge or could know from
re:cson2l.Jle investigation, in determining its duty to defend under a
Liability policy, although such facts are not alleged in the complaint in
tlce action brought against the insured.
Finally, in the case of United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. vs. Briscoe, 205 Okla.618, 239 P. 2d 754 (1951), the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that where the actual facts of the
case- are known to the insurer, the pleaded or alleged facts in the
petition become incidental, in determining whether the insurer has
the obligation to defend the action against the insured.
Here, the defense of the original lawsuit tendered to
trucccl Pacific

\\'<:IS

:J::fore this court.

refused in spite of its full knowledge of the facts
Clearly, the facts establish coverage under the

oc.lic\· and corresponding duty to defend.

The court shoulcl look to

c: r- accLLl or ascertainable facts to determine the duty to defend and
r0;

rc.cotdct itself to the allegations in the complaint.
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PUL\T

\Jl.

AFTEH A LOSS !L\S OCClilUtt:IJ ,\\D
RIGHTS OF THE POLICY Hr\ V L ACCRUED, /\l\ c'\SSIG.\1\Il-::\T l\HY BE
J\IIA DE \\ITHOUT TilE COI\SE:l\T OF
THE INSURER, EVEN THOUG!I THE
POLICY PHOHIBITS /\SSIGNMEJ'\T.

Simply put, there has not been any change in risk of lo,
where the accident occurred prior to the merger.

The Utah Supreme

Court in Time Finance Corp. vs. Johnson Co., 23 Utah 2d 115, 45B
P. 2d 873, 8 75 (196 9) recognized the general rule that after a loss has '

occurred and the rights of the policy have accrued, an assignment rna·
made without the consent of the insurer, even though the policy prohibits assignment.

In that case, Time Finance Corporation initiated,. f

action to recover the proceeds of an insurance policy covering a collisr.
loss from Occidental Fire and Casualty Company, the insurer. The h·'
sured, Johnson Trucking Company, had assigned all right, title and ir.·
terest to the proceeds of its insurance claim against its insurer to
Finance to secure a Promissory Note.

1

TD··I

Regarding the enforceability o~

the assigrunent, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In the instant action, since the property
insured under the policy had previously
been destroyed, the right to the proceeds
was a chose in action, which could be
assigned as any other chose in action, an~!
anv clause or col'dition in the policy rest;icting assignment could not limit the
ri;;ht of -assignment after the loss had
occurred.
The~ C:oud of _'\ppc,als of "'\rizona in St. Paul Fire &

0-Ltrtnc ln.s. Co. vs. i\lL;t::;te Ins. Co. 25 i\riz. !\pp. 30'}, S43 P.2d F
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After a loss hz,d incurr<ed and the
rigbl s ~:nde ~- the policy have accrued
an as3i;nment may be made without the
consent of the insurer. The assignmc:nt is no·.·: reganlcd as a transfer
of the policy itself, but ratl:er as a
chose in 2ction. [Citation omitted].
The general rule appears to be
that the liability and indemnity insurance policies are regarded
as personal contracts and cannot be assianed, especially
where an assignment is express! v
prohibited by the terms of the
policy, unless the insurer consents. [Citations omitted]. Howthis rule is based upo;the
right of the insurer to choose its
insured so as to know its risks.
Therefore, it is not applicable
when an assignment is made by
an insured after the liabilitycausing ev·ent has occurred.
[Citation omitted]. In such a
case, the general rule is that
the assignment is not of the
policy itself, but of a claim under,
or right of action on, the policy,
[Emphasis c\dded].

mr,-

POE\'T VIII.
OC\ ITS F.A. CE, THE UNITED Pi\. CIFIC
POLICY 'OTHER INSURc\NCE/ EXCESS'
CI~A. uSE IS ::\OT APPLICC>,BLE TO THIS
DISPUTE.
In the "other insurance" clause of the 1._:nited Pacific
polle-e iss•.•,,cJ to Regina stat<es:
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If :1t tllC l llllL of an CJCClll'J(•ntT
any \alicl :111d collectible irHLJI':lllcc·
is avail<•blc to the irtsllr<'d (in
this or 2ny other GJ.rrier), except insurance purchased to
aprly in excess of the limit of
li:J.bility of this policy, no insurance sh::tll be afford~·e
under as respects such occurrence·
except, if the applicable limit of
'
liability of this policy exceeds the
applicable limit of liability of such
other insurance, this policy shall
afford excess insurance over such
other insurance sufficient to afford
the insured a combined limit of
liability equal to the limit of liability of this policy. Insurance
under this policy shall not be
construed to be concurrent or
contributing with any other insurance whatever. [Emphasis Added).

It is universally recognized that where an insurance
policy is clear and unambiguous, the Court should give its interpret;.
tion in a cconlance with the hltlguagc of the policy.

See:

l\1arriot • s.

Pacific Nation3.l Life Assur:mcc Company, 24 Gtah 2cl 182, 457 l'.2d
881 (1870).

l3y inter jccting th(' actual facts into the United Pacific

"other insurance" clause it is clear and unan1biguous that on the date
of the 2.ccident Hcgim' lnd no other collectible insurance.
For ex2mple, tile United Pacific policy defines. the
"insured" as ''The n~'.•ncj inslll·ed" which in this case v:oulcl be:
1) Hc;':ina GLlpC Products Comp:my, a
CzdjJorni~ cnl·por<ttion;
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2) Hcgina Grape Products Company, a
Cal t:~(_,t'lli3 corpor2.tion;
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Ellena Brothers
Poca i\1as Wine Company
Garrett Bottling Company
San Sevine Vineyard Co.
Sycamore Valley Vineyards
(f) Verdemont Vineyards Company;

3) John B. Ellena and Arless T. Ellena.
It also defines "occurrence" as

. . . An Accident, an event or a
continuous or repeated exposure
to conditions causing, during the
policy period, bodily inJury or
property damage neither expected
or intended by the insured. All
injury or damage arising out of
exposure due to substantially the
same general condition shall be
considered as arising out of one
occurrence.
Which i.n this case that would be the accident of George
Shuput on December 31, 1970.
Placing the actual facts in context, the "other insurance"
clause would read:
If at the time of an occurrence,
December 31, 1970, any valid
and collectible insurance is
available to . . . the insured,
Regina Grapes Product Company.
no insurance shall be aforded hereunder as re:spects such occurrenct, the
accident on the 31st day of December,
1()70.
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